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One might think that liberals as well as conservatives would
agree that state registries of friendships are a bad idea. When it
comes to personal relationships, especially if they involve sex,
even supporters of a regulated economy usually oppose state
intervention. Yet many otherwise privacy-minded citizens favor
opening an official registry of gay and lesbian friendships, called
either "marriages" or "civil unions," backed by government
incentives to sign up. Are they making a mistake?
Perhaps some supporters of legal recognition of same-sex
unions adhere to what has been called, in jest, the German atti-
tude to freedom: "Whatever is not officially permitted by the
State is forbidden." They may think that homosexuals are not
free to form marriage-like relationships until the government
gives them a certificate of approval. But this is surely false.
Now that the United States Supreme Court, in Lawrence v.
Texas,' has decriminalized homosexual conduct throughout the
nation, gays and lesbians are as free as anyone else to seal long-
lasting sexual friendships with promises or vows (and supplement
them with property-related contracts, if so desired) without gov-
ernment approval. Like other forms of friendship and like heter-
osexual marriage, permanent same-sex friendships can exist
without state recognition of them. The argument for legal recog-
nition of same-sex unions does not seek liberty. It seeks state
involvement in what would otherwise be free personal
relationships.
Justice Antonin Scalia seems recently to have made the same
mistake, imagining that non-recognition of same-sex unions
amounts somehow to a prohibition against them. Dissenting in
the Lawrence case, Scalia writes:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity are .... called into question by today's deci-
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sion .... See ante, at 2480 (noting "an emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters per-
taining to sex' (emphasis added) [sic]).2
He adds that it is impossible to distinguish homosexual sod-
omy from "other traditional 'morals' offenses."3
However, same-sex marriage is not a criminal "offense."4
Indeed, it cannot be one as long as it has absolutely no existence
in the eyes of the law. Where the state ignores what homosexuals
do with their liberty-e.g. making and maintaining vows of fidel-
ity-the state cannot restrict that liberty.5 Scalia is thus wrong to
think that legal certification of same-sex unions is a logical conse-
quence of Lawrence's invalidation of state intrusion into personal
relationships.6
2. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. Although the Human Rights Campaign Foundation states that thirty-
seven states have "anti-gay marriage" statutes, in none of the listed statutes is
there a penalty, such as imprisonment or a fine, for homosexuals living
together in a marriage or marriage-like relationship (or attempting to do so).
See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, http://www.hrc.org/familynet/chap
ter.asp?article=554 (updated July 23, 2003) (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
5. Lawrence might invalidate a law (if there were one) that prohibited
homosexuals from making private marriage vows, because such a ban would
take notice of and prohibit one use of their liberty "pertaining to sex." A few
state laws might arguably fall into this category. For example, Arizona law
states, "Marriage between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited."
ARIz. RE:v. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) (West 2000). (However, the lack of any
attached penalty would seem to turn this "prohibition" into merely a redundant
statement of non-recognition.) In the same way, asJustice Scalia avers, Lawrence
could well lead to the abrogation of penalties for "bigamy," under the argument
that the number of one's permanent sexual partners is a private matter. But
Lawrence's goal of sexual liberty need not logically lead to official state recogni-
tion of bigamous unions. (Punishment for bigamy is an oddity in the criminal
law. Ordinarily, there can be no punishment for doing, or "attempting" to do,
that which one knows to be legally impossible-e.g., enter into a legally recog-
nized same-sex marriage. Thus it is extremely unlikely that any state would
enact laws penalizing invalid same-sex unions.)
6. The majority opinion in Lawrence supports the view of this essay that
liberty may require non-punishment without requiring state recognition: "The
statutes [banning homosexual sodomy] seek to control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." 123 S. Ct. at
2478. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government." Id.
at 2484. Any right to positive governmental intervention in the form of certifi-
cation is obviously quite a different question.
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But wait. Every modern state maintains a registry of certain
different-sex unions, i.e., of marriages. Doesn't this mean that
heterosexuals have a liberty that homosexuals lack, the liberty to
enter into registered unions? Perhaps, but only in the curious
sense that heterosexuals are free to become less free-and are
encouraged by the state to do so. For the most part, marriage-
related legislation limits, rather than increases, individual free-
dom: if heterosexuals try to marry two others at once, they
(unlike similarly-situated homosexuals) may be sanctioned for
bigamy-to take an obvious duty imposed by the state.7 Frankly,
marriage law can more easily seem like some hangover from an
earlier moral paternalism than like an instrument of individual
freedom; it is so regarded by many contemporary homosexual as
well as heterosexual thinkers.8
It makes no sense, however, to think that liberal, secular
states would go out of their way to restrict freedom for the sake
of an antiquated morality. And if governments were somehow
strongly interested in preserving ancient, quasi-religious customs,
why would they always stop at marriage? Why not officially certify
and reinforce the limitations that result from other spiritually-
significant relationship events, such as the ordination of priests
and ministers or the monastic vow of stability?9 But no modern
state does these things.
Why, then, do governments continue to register and struc-
ture heterosexual marriages, if not for the sake of morals or relig-
7. Marriage may also obstruct a participant's ability to separate by impos-
ing divorce proceedings, property division, and alimony; it may limit an individ-
ual's freedom to bequeath property upon death; it may make an individual
liable for spousal debts; and it may restrict a member's sexual partners through
social and even criminal norms. For instance, adultery-an offense only when a
married person is involved-is punishable in various states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 13A-13-2 (1994); COLO. RE-v. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-501 (West 1999); FLA. ANN.
STAT. § 798.01 (West 2000); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 272 § 14 (Law. Co-op. 1992);
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.30 (West 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17
(McKinney 2000).
8. See, e.g., Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
RExv. 505, 505 (1994) (arguing that "marriage lacks legal as well as experiential
coherence" and "is a place-holder for a series of idealized value judgments
about our intimate lives"); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUIN-
NIPiAC L. R-v. 27 (1996) (arguing that marriage is more aptly defined by its
benefits to government rather to than the married couple).
9. The Rule of St. Benedict states that when a man is to be received into a
monastery, "he comes before the whole community in the oratory and promises
stability, fidelity to monastic life, and obedience." THE RULE OF ST. BENEDICT
269 (Timothy Fry ed., Liturgical Press 1981) (emphasis added). The Rule
requires that someone be punished "who would presume to leave the enclosure
of the monastery, or go anywhere, . . . without the abbot's order." Id. at 289.
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ion? Is there some compelling reason that could account for
state intervention in different-sex unions, and only in those
unions? Everyone knows the answer: Sexual relationships
between women and men may generate children, beings at once
highly vulnerable and essential for the future of every human
community. The good of those children as well as the common
good thus require that that community do all it can to stabilize
and secure such relationships. Vows of lasting monogamy
receive public recognition and reinforcement because they help
produce human beings able to practice ordered liberty.' °
Does this singling out of potentially fertile relationships
entail disapprobation of infertile sorts of friendships? Not at
all-no more than the singling out of binding contracts for legal
enforcement entails disapproval of informal promise-making.
The government need not be trying to suppress the kinds of
friendships and promises it does not aid. It may simply prefer,
rightly, to leave us alone except where protection of the weak or
the common good requires intervention.
In fact, the infertile character of same-sex relations ought
legally to entitle homosexuals to a greater sexual freedom than
that of heterosexuals. Insofar as the sexual prohibitions listed
above by Justice Scalia are aimed at confining intercourse to
traditional marriage in order to protect any children conceived
or born as a result, there is no similar state interest in limiting
same-sex behavior. Bigamy has already been mentioned, but
people in same-sex unions ought also to be immune to prosecu-
tion for crimes like adultery as well. Such immunities can be
seen as special same-sex benefits flowing from the child-centered
rationale for legal marriage.
Along with limits, the public weal also requires special bene-
fits for relationships within which children may be born. Why
would a couple be willing to accept public involvement (and, to a
degree, control) in its most intimate concerns if it had no strong
incentives to do so? Furthermore, being faithful and raising chil-
dren obviously involve burdens still heavier than public intrusion
in the form of marriage laws. Since bearing these burdens even-
tually benefits the whole community, it makes sense for the com-
10. Justice Scalia is thus incorrect when he mocks Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor for describing "[the preservation of] the traditional institution of
marriage" as a "legitimate state interest." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496. He
claims that her use of the phrase "'preserving the traditional institution of mar-
riage' is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval of same-sex
couples." Id. at 2496. In fact, as the argument in this essay demonstrates, Jus-
tice O'Connor is right to say that "other reasons exist to promote the institution
of marriage beyond mere disapproval of an excluded group." Id. at 2488.
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munity to provide concrete rewards in the form of special tax,
social security, and other legal benefits.11 This is especially true
where one spouse-usually the woman, but sometimes the
man-gives up much or all of a career for the sake of raising
children. Such a parent voluntarily shares the vulnerability of his
or her children by becoming a dependent. Justice, the good of
the children, and the common good all demand that the com-
munity at least lessen the financial cost of such self-sacrifice.2
It is such benefits, not freedom to form permanent relation-
ships, that gays and lesbians obtain through official recognition
of their unions. They obtain a share of what really amount to
state subsidies, as well as of the public approval that goes along
with sacrificing for the good of others, in exchange for increased
legal regulation of their property and liberty. They may be mak-
ing a mistake as to their own best interests here, in terms of flexi-
bility and freedom.'" (Some gun owners find even simple
registration schemes ominous. How can gays and lesbians be
sure registry lists won't be harmful in the end?) In any event,
they certainly cannot claim a like community interest in their
unions, for gays and lesbians are not, nor do they generate, vul-
nerable citizens in need of special protection.
Unless: Aren't gay and lesbian unions also potentially fertile,
in that same-sex couples may jointly adopt children in some com-
munities? Such an argument is at least on the right track in
attempting to articulate a public interest in such unions. But it
does not really work.
Different-sex unions, without any outside help or knowledge
and without a conscious decision by either spouse, are able to
engender children. There is thus a public interest in stabilizing
11. Included among the benefits married persons enjoy are spousal privi-
lege under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Social Security survivors' benefits
based upon the spouse's work history, pension benefits, immigration prefer-
ences, immunity from Federal Estate and Gift Taxes on transfers between
spouses, health insurance benefits, tort rights in each other, intestate succession
preferences, and conjugal visits. See Homer, supra note 8, at 515.
12. Thus the Internal Revenue Code adds a special income tax benefit
(joint return) for such households. See I.R.C. § 1 (a) (West 2003).
13. See Laurie Essig, Same-Sex Marriage: I Don't Care if it is Legal, I Still Think
it's Wrong-And I'm a Lesbian, Salon.com, July 10, 2000, at http://dir.salon.
com/mwt/feature/2000/07/10/marriage/index.html (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); Paula Ettlebrick, Since When Is
Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted in WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 721 (2d ed. 1997); Homer,
supra note 8; Cain, supra note 8. For a thoughtful counter-argument (that
same-sex marriage is a good thing), see WILuAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR
SAME-SEx MARRIAGE (1996).
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them as soon as they exist. Same-sex unions in themselves are
absolutely infertile, so there is no possible child-related reason
why a community should care when they are formed or dissolved,
though it would wish to know if they were to adopt children. If a
community decides to permit same-sex partners to jointly
adopt, 4 then the point at which such adoptions take place is the
moment when such unions need to be stabilized. In other words,
adoption by same-sex couples is a good reason to grant legal rec-
ognition to their unions, but only at the time of each adoption-
not before.1 5
However, if the argument of this essay is right-that a liberal
regime should not get into the relationship-certification business
except to protect children-why would we permit marriage to
last far beyond child-bearing age and even permit elderly persons
and other infertile heterosexuals to marry?16 Letting marriage
14. For discussion of some of the policy issues here, see Charlotte J. Pat-
terson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Per-
spective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191 (1995) (arguing, through the use of
social science data, for homosexual adoption), and Lynn D. Wardle, The Poten-
tial Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. R.Ev. 833, 897
(1997) (arguing that "[t] he [social] impact on children of such radical changes
in the form and structure of the family and in the institution of marriage that is
the basis of the family, and of society, have not been carefully considered").
15. Besides protection of potential children and potential parents,
another reason to reinforce heterosexual unions ab initio is to make the ascrip-
tion of paternity more plausible. This problem cannot arise in a homosexual
union. If one partner has a child-e.g. by artificial insemination or other con-
sciously chosen process-it is known with absolute certainty that the other part-
ner is not the biological parent. Even if two gay men mix their semen before
inseminating a female friend, one of them can be shown by DNA testing to be
the only biological father. The parenthood of the second partner is called
adoption and is within the joint control of the partners and the state. There-
fore, the state need not be concerned about reinforcing the bond between a
child's potential same-sex parents until the adoption decision.
16. At the end of his dissenting opinion in Lawrence, Justice Scalia poses a
similar question: "[W]hat justification could there be for denying the benefits
of marriage to homosexual couples exercising '[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution' . . . ? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the
sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry." 123 S. Ct. at 2498.
His formulation contains two errors. Those who ask for new public bene-
fits for their liberty are those who need to come up with an adequate justifica-
tion, not the state that has never provided such benefits. And there is a better
formulation than "encouragement of procreation" to explain why the advocates
of same-sex marriage do not meet their burden of proof, namely, that homo-
sexual unions cannot in themselves produce children in need of state protec-
tion. This child-protective reason for recognizing only heterosexual marriages
remains valid even if, perhaps because of some fear of overpopulation, the state
does not wish to encourage procreation. (But for a defense of procreation as a
state interest, see Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish ": Considering Same-Sex
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARv. J. L. & PUB.
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last a lifetime is easy to justify. Even adult children often need
their parents' guidance and security in raising their own kids. It
would be disruptive of ongoing family life, as well as often unfair
to a dependent, non-working spouse, to terminate marriage auto-
matically as soon as the wife becomes infertile, while allowing the
still-fertile husband to get married again. Perhaps we could
screen people for infertility before letting them marry. But such
screening would probably be a burdensome and politically unac-
ceptable invasion of our privacy."7 And there would quite often
remain at least a slight chance of a child emerging from hetero-
sexual relations,' as against zero chance from homosexual
relations.19
POL'Y 771 (2001)). (Scalia is on the mark, however, in asking why a child-pro-
tective marriage law would recognize unions among "the sterile and the
elderly.")
17. See Steven R. Gabel, IME'S: Are Invasive Techniques and Sedation Permis-
sible?, 75 MICH. B.J. 836 (1996) (exploring the issue of state-mandated medical
procedures, including fertility testing, through practical and constitutional
considerations).
18. See Miller v. Rivard, 585 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (male
conceived child just months after a fertility test found him sterile); Lefkowitz v.
Nassau County Medical Center, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 903, 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(upholding appellant's right to refuse a fertility test on the ground of its poten-
tial danger, while noting evidence that the test might not produce conclusive
results on the patient's fertility).
19. If infertility were easy to determine with certainty and in a non-intru-
sive way, then the argument of this essay would indeed cut against legal mar-
riage for infertile heterosexual couples.
Some readers may be concerned about this conclusion for the practical
reason that under traditional Judeo-Christian morality, unmarried persons may
not obtain the unitive benefits of sexual intercourse. However, the absence of
legal marriage would not preclude religious marriage, or other forms of private
mutual commitment, that could make sexual relations appropriate and
profound even for elderly and other infertile persons. Anti-fornication statutes
could nominally be applied to such unrecognized unions, but these laws are
rarely enforced and would probably be held invalid under Lawrence, especially if
they were used to penalize clearly infertile couples (where there would be no
state interest in preventing procreation by unmarried persons). Because homo-
sexual couples are in disagreement with a core part of traditional Judeo-Chris-
tian teaching on sexual relations, i.e., that which forbids homosexual acts, it
seems less likely that they would feel a similar need to enter into marriage
before having sex with one another. But if they did, an unofficial commitment
ceremony would be possible for them as well. See also the discussion in supra
note 5.
Other readers might raise a deeper, more theoretical (and perhaps more
telling) objection to the implication of this essay that clearly infertile heterosex-
uals might properly be denied legal marriage. Even where they are infertile,
males and females can be said to be in their nature (as shown, e.g., by their
anatomy) to be designed for heterosexual reproduction and thus for marriage.
Is a person's "nature" an impermissible category for legal treatment? Is current
2004]
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All that has been said so far amounts to an argument that
the reasons behind legal recognition of different-sex unions do
not lead to official certification of same-sex unions. Those pro-
posing legal recognition of the latter cannot show that fairness or
protection of the vulnerable or nurture of future citizens
requires state intervention. But there are also great harms gener-
ated by such recognition.
First of all, it is unjust to the community as a whole that the
public purse be used to subsidize couples that do not, as couples,
equally serve the common good. Those subsidies were set up to
encourage and support unions that are in their nature able to
generate children. It is not right to siphon these benefits off and
pass them on to people to use largely for their private benefit.
Furthermore, to reward some private relationships would be
unjust to many remaining unsubsidized relationships. If provid-
ing emotional security (or division of labor, or economies of
scale, or some other such benefit) were considered a sufficient
reason to recognize same-sex couples, why not groups of three,
four, or fourteen? And why limit official unions to those based
on sex? A monk's ties to a monastery might be strengthened by
legally-imposed duties. In fact, how could any sort of non-crimi-
nal friendship rightly remain unsubsidizable, under the Equal
Protection Clause?
David Chambers of the University of Michigan Law School,
in an article favoring same-sex marriage, has written:
[W]e should respect ... claims made against the hegem-
ony of the two-person unit ....
If the law of marriage can be seen as facilitating
the opportunities of two people to live an emotional life
that they find satisfying-rather than as imposing a view of
proper relationships-the law ought to be able to achieve
the same for units of more than two.
... By ceasing to conceive of marriage as a partnership
composed of one person of each sex, the state may become
more receptive to units of three or more ... and to units
functional capacity the only valid legal criterion? If so, how can we continue to
consider any serious disabled persons to possess full human dignity under the
law? For further reflections, see John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Moral-
ity of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JuRs.
97 (1997).
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composed of two people of the same sex but who are
bound by friendship alone.
2 0
What would happen if we took Professor Chambers' advice
and offered generous public benefits to every emotionally satisfy-
ing, long-term relationship? Would the direct and indirect costs
rise so high that they could no longer be paid? Consider, if you
will, not only economic costs, but also the quality of civil society.
Do we really want a State Friendship Registry? Even if the gov-
ernment used mainly positive incentives, rather than penalties, to
support its scheme, would there not be too great an intrusion
into private life? Would we not have lost too much freedom and
flexibility in our personal relationships? Would we not have cre-
ated an excessive bureaucracy?
Surely the answer is "yes." Yet every omission from the offi-
cial list would be rightly attacked as discriminatory as long as the
purpose of registration were to provide primarily private benefits.
If the way back to public support solely for heterosexual marriage
were politically closed, I predict the government would decide
just to get out of the registration business entirely. No relation-
ships at all would be certified or subsidized. Children would not
be abandoned-professional childcare would no doubt flour-
ish-but the legal institution of marriage would disappear.
20. David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the
Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447, 490-91 (1996).
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